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Abstract
Human cooperation is typically coordinated by institutions, which determine the
outcome structure of the social interactions individuals engage in. Explaining the
Neolithic transition from small- to large-scale societies involves understanding how
these institutions co-evolve with demography. We study this using a demographically
explicit model of institution formation in a patch-structured population. Each patch
supports both social and asocial niches. Social individuals create an institution, at
a cost to themselves, by negotiating how much of the costly public good provided by
cooperators is invested into sanctioning defectors. The remainder of their public good is
invested in technology that increases carrying capacity, such as irrigation systems. We
show that social individuals can invade a population of asocials, and form institutions
that support high levels of cooperation. We then demonstrate conditions where the
co-evolution of cooperation, institutions, and demographic carrying capacity creates a
transition from small- to large-scale social groups.
2
Introduction
Understanding the origin of large-scale human societies is of interest to both the social
and biological sciences. For many millennia humans lived in small-scale hunter-gatherer
societies, engaging in localized cooperative interactions such as hunting and food sharing
(Boehm, 1999; Kaplan et al., 2009; Whiten & Erdal, 2012). Much work has addressed how
cooperation could evolve under natural selection in such small-scale societies. Mechanisms
for this include kin discrimination (Hamilton, 1975; Dawkins, 1976), direct and indirect
reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005), punishment of defectors (Oliver, 1980;
Boyd & Richerson, 1992), and cultural group selection (Boyd & Richerson, 1990; Turchin,
2010).
Models of these mechanisms, however, usually assume that the choice of actions by
group members are uncoordinated. That is, each individual decides in isolation whether to
cooperate or not, whether and who to punish, etc. While the extent to which hunter-gatherer
groups meet the assumption of entirely uncoordinated social decisions has been questioned
(Boyd et al., 2010; Whiten & Erdal, 2012; Guala, 2012), this assumption becomes even
more problematic when attempting to explain the origin of large-scale societies. This is
because post hunter-gatherer groups engage in social behaviours that affect a large number
of individuals, and which require some degree of coordination and planning; clear examples
include the construction of irrigation channels, trade links, and fortifications. In particular,
human groups typically have various institutions that help to coordinate social interactions
and diffuse social dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990; Hurwicz, 1996; Turchin, 2003;
Guala, 2012). A key question is then: how can cooperation-promoting institutions co-evolve
with demography to create a transition from small- to large-scale social groups? Addressing
this provides an understanding of the role of social evolution in the Neolithic Demographic
Transition and the origin of agricultural societies.
We study this here using a model of the cultural co-evolution of social institutions and
demography. By “institution”, we follow the game-theoretic definition in which an insti-
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tution represents a set of game forms (Hurwicz, 1996). That is, an institution is a set of
alternative rules (“rules of the game”) that determines the outcomes of the social interac-
tions individuals engage in (e.g. different possible distributions of material resources). The
particular institutional rules that will be implemented are then selected from this set. Hu-
mans need not remain trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, but rather they may form
an institution and communicate with each other such as to agree upon rules that transform
the game structure into one where cooperation may be a stable equilibrium (Ostrom, 1990;
Ostrom & Gardner, 1993).
Real-world examples of this process are provided by the self-organized management of
irrigation systems (Hunt, 1988; Trawick, 2001; Janssen et al., 2012), where rules devised
and enforced by the resource users themselves can prevent a Tragedy of the Commons
(Hardin, 1968) in water usage. For example, institutional rules might specify how much
water may be taken and when, as in the six hundred year old self-managed huerta irrigation
systems in Valencia, Murcia and Alicante (Ostrom, 1990) . Rules may also specify how
often individuals should contribute to construction and maintenance of the system, as in the
zanjera irrigation systems in the Phillipines (Ostrom, 1990). In both cases, the institutional
rules are created by a peer assembly of group members, and are enforced through both
peer monitoring and the creation of formal guard roles that are funded from the irrigator’s
common resources. These examples illustrate that cooperation-promoting institutions do
not have to be coercively imposed by a dominant leader, as has been assumed in some
recent evolutionary models (e.g., Hooper et al. 2010; Isakov & Rand 2011; Sasaki et al.
2012). Moreover, as examples of the institutionalized regulation of irrigation systems, they
are of direct relevance to the origin of agricultural societies (Carballo, 2013).
We consider a scenario in which individuals can voluntarily choose to take part in a
social activity, and create institutional rules to regulate it. These individuals compete with
asocials that choose not to take part in, or benefit from, the social activity, and whose
payoffs are not affected by the institutional rules and the cost of their formation (these
individuals are asocial in the sense of not joining the institution; they could still have other
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social interactions such as consumption of shared resources within groups). The particular
case that we consider is the option to engage in the cooperative development and usage of
agricultural technology, as exemplified by an irrigation system. This technology provides a
benefit to those that produce it, by increasing their yield. Through the resulting increase in
carrying capacity, the development of such technology is thought to have been a driver of
the transition from small-scale nomadic, to larger-scale sedentary societies (Spencer, 1993;
Carballo et al., 2012).
We model the technology as a partly excludible good – asocial individuals that do not take
part in its production are not able to benefit from it. However, amongst social individuals
that choose to participate, there is the opportunity for free-riding. Social individuals then
play a two-stage game. In the first stage, the institution is formed and individuals determine
how much of their common resources (a fraction 1−h) should be used to monitor and sanction
free-riding defectors – this is the formation of institutional rules governing the social activity.
The remainder of their common resources (h) are invested in production of the technology.
We assume that all social individuals pay a cost to form the institution, which represents
the time and effort spent creating the institutional rules. In the second stage of the game,
after the sanctioning rules have been agreed upon, social individuals play a public goods
game. Defectors are then sanctioned according to the institutional rules agreed in the first
stage.
We demonstrate here that the co-evolution of institution formation, cooperation, and
demography in such a setting can provide an explanation for the transition from small- to
large-scale societies.
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The model
Lifecycle and population structure
We consider a population that is subdivided into a finite number Np of resource patches
or sites (Wright’s 1931 finite island model of dispersal). The lifecycle consists of discrete
and non-overlapping generations, as follows. (1) Local interactions occur on each patch,
with social individuals forming an institution. (2) Each individual on a patch has a Poisson
distributed number of offspring that survive to adulthood, with the mean of the distribution
being determined by the local social interactions and resource abundance (defined explicitly
below). (3) Adults of the previous generation perish. (4) Each individual of the descendant
generation either remains on its local patch (with probability 1 − m) or disperses to a
randomly chosen patch (excluding the natal one).
Individuals in this population carry two cultural traits that are transmitted vertically
from parents to offspring – an important mode of cultural transmission in extant hunter-
gatherer groups (Hewlett et al., 2011), and one which parallels genetic transmission (Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman, 1981). The first trait determines the social behavior of individuals.
Specifically, whether the individual joins an institution and contributes to the public good
(is a cooperator), joins an institution but does not contribute (is a defector), or remains
outside of an institution and hence receives no public good or sanctioning (is asocial). A
mutation (or innovation) on this trait changes the value to one of the other two variants
chosen at random. The second trait is a continuous number h varying between 0 and 1,
which is interpreted phenotypically as the proportion of public good that the bearer would
like its group to invest in helping as opposed to sanctioning. Asocials carry this trait but
do not express it, since they do not participate in institution formation. A mutation on
this trait changes the value according to a truncated normally distributed random variable
(with variance σ), centered around the current trait value. The probability that an offspring
undergoes a mutation is µ, in which case one of the two traits sampled at random is mutated.
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How the institution affects reproduction
Fitness
The expected number wτj(t) of offspring that survive to adulthood (fitness) produced by
an individual of type τ ∈ {a, c,d} (asocial, cooperator, and defector, respectively) in patch
j at time t is assumed to follow a Beverton-Holt model (e.g. Chow & Hsieh 2013) with two
niches. Specifically, cooperators and defectors (socials) on a patch occupy a social niche in
which they can improve their environment through cooperative investment in technology.
Asocials do not take part in or benefit from this activity, and hence occupy a different
ecological niche. An example would be a horticultural rather than agricultural mode of
subsistence (Kaplan et al., 2009). The degree of competition between these niches is set by
two parameters, αas and αsa, which give the per capita effect of socials on asocials’ fitness,
and asocials on socials’ fitness, respectively. According to these assumptions, we write the
fitnesses of the three types on patch j at time t as
waj(t) =
ra
1 + naj(t)/Ka + αas [ncj(t) + ndj(t)]
wcj(t) =
rc
1 + [ncj(t) + ndj(t)] /Ksj(t) + αsanaj(t)
wdj(t) =
rdj(t)
1 + [ncj(t) + ndj(t)] /Ksj(t) + αsanaj(t)
, (1)
where nτj(t) is the number of individuals of type τ on patch j at time t. The numerator
in each expression can be thought of as the maximal growth rate of an individual of the
corresponding type, while the denominator as the intensity of density-dependent competition
faced by that individual. We now detail the parameters in these expressions.
Growth rate and sanctioning
First, ra (≥ 0) is the maximal growth rate of an asocial type. Namely, its growth rate in
the absence of density dependence, which occurs when the denominator of waj(t) is equal
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to one. The maximal growth rate of a cooperator is assumed to be given by
rc = ra − I − C, (2)
where I (≥ 0) is the cost of participating in institution formation, while C (≥ 0) is the
individual cost of producing an amount B of public good. This entails that an amount
ncj(t)B of public good is created on patch j by cooperators, which can be devoted to
resource enhancement or sanctioning. Social defectors participate in institution formation
but do not contribute to the public good, and can be sanctioned for this. We assume that
the maximal growth rate of a defector is
rdj(t) = ra − I − (1− hj(t))ncj(t)B
ndj (t)
, (3)
where 1− hj(t) is the proportion of the public good produced on patch j devoted to sanc-
tioning. We assume that this fraction of the public good is used for two purposes: first,
to fund a monitoring and sanctioning system, and second, to incentivize monitoring behav-
ior by providing direct benefits to individuals that actively monitor. We provide empirical
examples of such a setup in the Discussion section, but we do not explicitly model at the
micro level the monitoring and sanctioning actions that take place after an institution has
been formed (see Weissing & Ostrom 2000 for such a model). Instead, our focus is on the
selection pressures that population structure and demography exert on institutional forms.
Given these assumptions, (1− hj(t))ncjB/ndj(t) represents the per capita cost of being
sanctioned for defecting. The value of hj(t) in our model is set by an aggregation rule, as is
standard in social choice theory (Conradt & List, 2009). This is a function that transforms
a collection of individual preferences into a group’s institution, and represents a functional
abstraction of the communication and negotiation process between social individuals on a
patch. This type of functional abstraction is often used in models of decision making in
animal social groups (Conradt & Roper, 2003; Conradt & List, 2009), where the effects of
the outcome of the decision-making process on fitness are of more evolutionary interest than
the proximate behavioral mechanisms underlying it. We first consider the case where hj(t)
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is set by the mean preference of social individuals on patch j:
hj(t) =
1
ncj(t) + ndj(t)
nj(t)∑
i=1
sij(t)hij(t), (4)
where sij(t) = 1 if individual i on patch j is a cooperator or defector (i.e. a “social”),
sij(t) = 0 otherwise, hij(t) is the preference of individual i on patch j at time t, and
nj(t) = ncj(t) + ndj(t) + naj(t) is the total number of individuals on patch j. This type of
decision making is well documented empirically in animal social groups (Conradt & Roper,
2003), as well as in humans from hunter-gatherers to industrial societies (Hastie & Kameda,
2005).
Carrying capacity enhancement
The parameter Ka (≥ 0) in Eq. 1 can be thought of as the “carrying capacity” of asocial
individuals, which is the base carrying capacity in the absence of social interactions. This
interpretation follows from the fact that in the absence of cooperators and defectors, and
assuming deterministic growth, the equilibrium number of asocials on a patch is (ra − 1)Ka.
Throughout this paper we fix ra = 2 (without loss of generality), so that Ka can be regarded
as the intrinsic carrying capacity of a patch in the absence of social interactions.
A key element of our model is that the institution, by facilitating coordinated cooperation,
allows the possibility of increasing the carrying capacity Ksj(t) of social individuals. This is
a dynamic variable depending on the remainder of the public good not used for sanctioning:
hj(t)ncj(t)B. This good is invested into increasing the carrying capacity of cooperators and
defectors on the patch, for which we assume the functional form
Ksj(t) = Ka + β [1− exp (−γhj(t)ncj(t)B)] , (5)
which is a positive concave function of the number of cooperators. The benefits of increased
public good eventually become saturated, with a maximal possible increase in carrying
capacity of β. The parameter γ sets the gradient of the increase in carrying capacity with
respect to investment in cooperation.
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Our model defines a stochastic process for the state variables (naj(t), ncj(t), ndj(t),
hj(t)) in each patch j of the spatially structured population. These variables allow us to
evaluate the average frequency of each type, and the average h-value in the population.
Due to the strong non-linearity of our model, we analyze the stochastic process by means
of individual-based simulations. The baseline parameters used for the simulations, unless
otherwise specified, are given in Table 1.
Results
Before proceeding to the analysis of the full model, we first present results for a population
where social interactions are well mixed (single patch), in order to aid intuition of the model
dynamics.
Evolution under well-mixed social interactions
Neither cooperators, defectors, or asocials are stable in well-mixed social interactions (Fig. 1a).
Cooperators may invade a population of asocials, once their frequency rises above a thresh-
old by stochastic means. But cooperators are stable against defectors only when the cost
of cooperating is less than the cost of being sanctioned [C < (1− h(t))nc(t)B/nd(t)]. This
depends upon the h-value of the institution, and, in turn, on the h-preferences of the so-
cial individuals (Eq. 4). However, under well-mixed social interactions there is no selection
pressure on individual h-preferences. This is because the only way that an individual’s h-
preference affects its fitness is through its contribution to forming the institution (Eq. 4),
the effects of which are felt by all social individuals on the patch equally (Eq. 3 and 5). As
a consequence, the h-value of the institution changes entirely as a result of mutations to
individual h-preferences (Fig. 1a).
Because of these mutations, the institutional h-value may increase over time. However, as
it becomes close to one then cooperation can no longer be maintained in the face of mutant
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defectors. This is because too little of the public good of social individuals is invested
into sanctioning defectors, and so the cost of cooperating becomes greater than the cost
of being sanctioned. Consequently, defectors replace cooperators. Defectors, in turn, are
then replaced by asocials. This is due to the loss of cooperative investment in technology,
which means that the carrying capacity of social individuals is no longer enhanced relative
to asocials (Eq. 5 and Fig. 1b). However, defectors still pay the cost, I, of forming an
institution. This means that in the absence of cooperators they are less fit than asocials,
and so the social niche is no longer viable.
The end result is that under well-mixed social interactions, cooperation cannot be main-
tained as a stable equilibrium. Even though institutions can sometimes be successfully
formed, there is no selection pressure towards those that support cooperation. However,
as the next section shows, institutional evolution is very different in a spatially structured
population.
Evolution in a spatially structured population
Dynamics of institutional evolution
We first consider a structured population with the following ecological and demographic
parameter values: Ka = 20, B = 0.9, I = 0.1, γ = 0.0075. In such a population, cooper-
ators are able to invade asocials when rare (Fig. 2a, all simulations were started from an
initial condition in which asocials are fixed within every patch, and the h-preference of each
individual set randomly from a uniform distribution). Investment in public good can then
remain stable even in the presence of recurrent defector and asocial mutations (Fig. 2d),
and in the presence of recurrent mutations to individual h-preferences (Fig. 2e).
Crucially, once cooperation has invaded, it is maintained even as the number of social
individuals subsequently increases to a very large size. In particular, although the base
patch carrying capacity needs to be relatively small at the start of invasion (for instance
20 individuals in Fig. 2) in order to guarantee direct or indirect benefits, after invasion it
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substantially increases (by tenfold in Fig. 2f), due to the benefits of cooperation invested in
environmental improvement. The individual h-preferences typically evolve to large values,
but not to unity (approximately in the the range of 0.8 to 0.9; Figs. 2b and 2e). An
institutional h-value in this range provides sufficient sanctioning for cooperators to remain
stable against defectors, while allowing a large increase in the carrying capacity of socials
(Fig. 2f). This increase in the carrying capacity of social individuals makes the institutional
h-value evolutionarily stable against invasion by asocials, who may reoccur on the patch by
mutation or migration.
Why do the individual h-preferences stabilize when social interactions are structured?
In a structured population, there is variation in institutional h-values. Individuals under
different institutions will then have different expected numbers of offspring, depending on
the h-value on their patch (Eq. 1 and 5). Individuals benefit from institutions with an h-
value that decreases density-dependent competition, as they produce more offspring. This
in turn increases patch size. Crucially, patches whose institutions sustain a larger number of
individuals also export a larger absolute number of migrants. Because migrants carry their
h-preferences to their new patch, they cause the institution in their new patch to become
more like the one in their natal patch. Thus, institutions with an h-value that causes the
number of social individuals to grow to a larger size will export more migrants, and hence
their members will spread their institution form to other patches.
In this way, the variance in h-values between patches creates a selection pressure favoring
larger individual h-preferences, and hence the creation of institutions that invest more public
good into increasing carrying capacity. On the other hand, too large an institutional h-value
causes defectors to increase in frequency, and hence the amount of public good produced to
decline. This in turn causes a decrease in the carrying capacity of individuals under such
institutions, which then means that they export absolutely fewer migrants per generation.
Thus, institutions with too large an h-value also spread their institution form at a slower rate.
As a result, migration between patches favors an evolutionarily stable type of institution
that invests most, but not all, of the public good into increasing carrying capacity.
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By creating competition between institutions, population structure and migration gen-
erate a selection pressure on individual institutional preferences. Successful institutions
sanction – but not too hard.
The co-evolution of institutions and demography can produce a transition to
very large-scale cooperation
The results in Fig. 2 illustrate that the co-evolution of institutions with patch carrying
capacity can produce cooperation between groups of 200 individuals. This is already a large
number of individuals, and one for which cooperation would be unlikely to evolve if it were
the initial patch carrying capacity, Ka (see also Sensitivity to parameters, below). Can
this co-evolution allow for the emergence of cooperation between an even larger number
of individuals? The parameter β sets an upper bound for the amount that technology
can increase carrying capacity in our model. To investigate the co-evolution of larger-scale
cooperation we therefore increased β tenfold, to 3000, thus allowing for the possibility of
larger groups given sufficient investment in technology. We correspondingly decreased γ by
tenfold to 0.00075, in order to keep the gradient of the benefit function (Eq. 5) proportionate.
We again set the initial patch carrying capacity equal to 20. Rare cooperators again invaded
asocials, and cooperation remained stable even as the number of social individuals grew
from 20 to 1000 (Figs. 3a and 3c). The population mean of individual h-preferences again
remained in the region of 0.8–0.9 (Fig. 3b). This demonstrates that the co-evolution of
institutions with demography can create a transition from small to very large cooperative
groups.
Sensitivity to parameters
We investigated sensitivity to the model parameters (Fig. 4). For each set of parameters, we
started from a structured population fixed for asocials in every patch, and ran the simulation
for 50000 generations. We recorded whether cooperators were at a global frequency greater
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than 0.95, averaged over the last 1000 generations of the simulation run. We refer to this
as the cooperative equilibrium being reached in that run (in no trial did we ever observe
cooperation to decrease below 0.95 frequency, once it had exceeded this level). We repeated
this process 100 times for each set of parameters, and plotted the number of runs in which the
cooperative equilibrium was reached. Our analysis focused on how changing each parameter
affected the largest initial patch size (Ka) under which cooperators could reliably invade
within 50000 generations, and be maintained at greater than 0.95 frequency. All other
parameters were kept at their base values as given in Table 1.
Decreasing the benefit of cooperation (B) decreases the largest initial patch size under
which cooperators can invade and maintain an institution (Fig. 4a). In addition, when
cooperation does invade, the carrying capacity of social individuals is enhanced by a lower
amount for lower B (Fig. S1a). This follows from the fact that less public good is available
to be invested in environmental improvement (Eq. 5). Increasing the cost of creating an
institution, I, also decreases the largest patch size under which cooperators can invade
asocials (Fig. 4b). However, when the cost of creating an institution is set to zero, then
cooperators can invade under a larger range of patch sizes. Figure 4c shows that the range
of patch sizes under which cooperators can invade also increases with the gradient (γ) of
the benefit function in Eq. 5. Increasing the gradient also increases the equilibrium number
of cooperators and hence makes the value of Ksj(t) reached closer to the asymptotic value
of Eq. 5, β (Fig. S1b). That is, cooperators increase in number when the benefit assigned
to environmental improvement produced by one extra cooperator, hB, raises the carrying
capacity of social individuals by at least one.
Figure 4d shows that increasing the migration rate between patches decreases the maxi-
mum patch size under which cooperators reliably invade asocials. Intuitively, this is because
increased migration decreases the variance between patches (or relatedness between individ-
uals in a patch), and so reduces the indirect fitness benefits of cooperation that accrue from
helping relatives, a direct consequence of limited dispersal (Hamilton, 1971). Indeed, in the
limiting case of panmictic migration (given by m = 1− 1/Np), there are no indirect benefits
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to cooperation. However, because there are a number of patches there is still competition
between institutions, unlike in the case of a single patch. Thus, institutional h-values can
still potentially stabilize and support cooperation. We found that under panmictic migra-
tion between patches, cooperators could reliably invade solely through direct fitness benefits
if the initial patch size was below 17. Indirect fitness benefits, and hence limited dispersal,
are required for cooperation to invade under patch sizes larger than this.
Sensitivity to other model assumptions
For the results presented so far, we assumed that the institutional h-value was formed by
taking the mean h-preference of social individuals on the patch (Eq. 4). This is but one
possible way of aggregating individual preferences. Two other possible ways are to take
the modal preference, or to have one individual act as a leader and obtain the institutional
h-value from its own h-preference. We investigated the effect of both of these cases in
our model (Appendix S1). Importantly, we found the model results to be qualitatively
insensitive to forming the institutional h-value in either of these ways, as opposed to taking
the mean h-preference of social individuals on the patch. This therefore suggests that our
results are quite robust to the particular mechanistic details of how the institutional h-value
is aggregated from individual preferences.
We also investigated the effect of relaxing several other assumptions. We first relaxed
the assumption that social individuals are always able to reach an agreement about the
institutional h-value, by allowing for the failure to reach consensus if the variance in socials’
h-preferences was greater than a threshold value (Appendix S2). We also relaxed the as-
sumption that all social individuals must take part in institutional negotiations, and pay the
cost I for doing so. Instead, we allowed for socials that do not pay I, and whose h-preferences
are not taken into account when forming the institutional h-value (Appendix S3). We found
that a small fraction of individuals pay I at equilibrium (Fig. S3), which is sufficient to
maintain an institution (the selection pressure for some individuals to pay I again results
from population structure and migration: demes with some individuals that do pay I are
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able to form an institution and grow to a larger size, and thus export more migrants). We
also considered the effect of varying the efficiency of sanctioning, by multiplying the per
capita cost of being sanctioned by a constant between 0 and 1 (Appendix S4). Finally, we
considered a version of the model (Appendix S5) that is reminiscent of “pool punishment”
models of sanctioning (Sigmund et al., 2010; Perc, 2012), in which mutant individuals may
pay for cooperation but not for sanctioning. We found that in all of these variants, so-
cial individuals were still able to invade and maintain institutions under a wide range of
parameters (Figs. S2–S7).
Discussion
Starting from a population consisting entirely of asocials, we determined conditions under
which social individuals could invade and create institutions that support cooperation in
very large groups, thereby generating a transition from small- to large-scale social groups.
Unlike in related models that include asocial individuals (Sigmund et al., 2010; Sasaki et al.,
2012), their presence is not necessary for the invasion of punishment. Rather, the inclusion
of asocials in our model actually makes establishment of an institution more difficult, by
providing outside options. Our results show that for invasion of a costly institution to occur,
the patch size must initially be relatively small (Fig. 4). However, once social individuals
have invaded, the institution drives a large increase in the scale of cooperation, and is
maintained in the face of recurrent mutations (Fig. 3).
A structured population generates variation in institutional h-values (a group-level trait),
which causes individuals with different h-preferences in different patches to produce different
expected numbers of offspring. Variation between institutional h-values therefore generates
a selective pressure on individual h-preferences, which is particularly strong in our explicit
demographic model owing to the fact that individuals form institutions that are likely to
increase local carrying capacity. This increase in carrying capacity generally markedly raises
the selection pressure on social traits causing it (Lehmann et al., 2006), since their carriers
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export a significantly larger number of successful migrant offspring than individuals liv-
ing in smaller groups. Thus, individuals rapidly spread their institutional and behavioral
preferences to other patches. In this way, group structure solves the problem posed by insti-
tution evolution when interactions are well-mixed. Importantly, warfare, group extinctions,
or group fissioning are not required for this mechanism to work. The spread of institutions
through population growth and migration is aligned with the demic diffusion hypothesis for
the spread of agriculture across Neolithic Europe (Ammerman & Cavalli-Sforza, 1984).
The degree to which the carrying capacity of human groups was affected by the origin
of agricultural technology is an important empirical question. Data from cemeteries show a
marked increase in fertility during the origin of agriculture, indicating significant population
growth (Bocquet-Appel, 2011). Other studies suggest that while the population density of
hunter-gatherer groups is usually below 0.1 person/sq. mi., that of early dry farmers is
around 4 persons/sq. mi. (Hassan & Sengel, 1973). Moreover, estimates for the population
density of early irrigation farming have ranged from 16 to 25 person/sq. mi (Hassan &
Sengel, 1973). Thus, the density of human groups practissing irrigation farming may have
been up to 250 times greater than that of hunter-gatherers. Such data suggests that a
relatively large value of β is plausible in our model.
Our institutional approach to sanctioning should be contrasted with typical models of
peer or “altruistic” punishment (e.g. Boyd & Richerson 1992; Boyd et al. 2003; Nakamaru
& Iwasa 2005; Lehmann et al. 2007). In those models, each cooperator decides in isolation
whether to punish a defector or not, and pays a unilateral cost for doing so. The main focus
of such models is then to address the “second-order free-rider” problem. That is, if acts
of punishment are individually costly to the punisher, then the sanctioning system itself
becomes a public good that is vulnerable to exploitation. If such altruistic punishment is
to evolve, then it must be through indirect, kin selected benefits (it is often suggested that
these necessary indirect benefits arise through quite specific mechanisms, such as pairwise
intergroup warfare under limited dispersal, e.g., Boyd et al. 2003). However, outside of arti-
ficial economic games played in the laboratory, empirical evidence for punishment acts that
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decrease the direct lifetime fitness of the punisher remains scant (Baumard, 2010; Guala,
2012). Rather, field studies have demonstrated that successful sanctioning institutions work
by creating conditions that provide direct benefits to individuals that actively monitor and
enforce institutional rules (Ostrom, 1990; Baumard, 2010; Guala, 2012). Our model has cap-
tured these direct benefits in a simple manner, by considering the evolution of institutional
rules that allow for the individual costs of monitoring and sanctioning to be paid for from the
public good. A similar abstraction from the mechanistic details of day-to-day monitoring
and sanctioning has also been used in recent models of pool punishment (Sigmund et al.,
2010; Perc, 2012). Nevertheless, it is insightful to consider anthropological evidence for how
monitoring and sanctioning is incentivized on a mechanistic level.
Ostrom (1990) describes how the use of common land in the Hirano, Nagaike, and Ya-
manoka villages in Japan was governed by a set of institutional rules that determined how
much a household could harvest from the commons each year, and at what time. The vil-
lages then often used some of their common resources to hire monitors – individuals that
specialized in patrolling the commons and reporting violations. These individuals were fur-
ther incentivized to actively monitor, by allowing them to demand a supply of money and
sake´ from any defectors that they personally found (Ostrom, 1990). Thus, sanctioning be-
came a profitable activity for those monitors that were efficient in finding defectors (Guala,
2012). Similarly, in the huerta irrigation systems in Spain, individual irrigators were often
nominated to act as monitors by their peers, and were incentivized by being able to keep a
third of the fine levied on any defector that they found (Ostrom, 1990).
Furthermore, the monitors are themselves accountable to ordinary group members in the
commons institutions studied by Ostrom (1990). A monitor that is seen to under perform
can be quickly stripped of the role, causing the cost of shirking to be greater than the cost
of monitoring. In all of these empirical cases, institutional arrangements cover the cost of
monitoring and sanctioning and so prevent a second-order free-rider problem from occurring.
Coordinated, large-scale, cooperation between individuals was likely to have become
particularly important during the transition from hunter-gatherer to agricultural societies
18
(Boone, 1992; Kaplan et al., 2009; Hooper et al., 2010; Carballo et al., 2012). For example,
there is archaeological evidence that the need to cooperatively construct irrigation systems
was a driver in the evolution of social institutions in prehispanic Mexico (Spencer, 1993;
Carballo et al., 2012). Construction of an irrigation system can, in turn, increase carrying
capacity. Co-evolution of institution creation, cooperation, and demography could therefore
be a key driver in the transition from small-scale hunter-gatherer to large-scale agricultural
societies. Our model has demonstrated the logical cogency of such an explanation.
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Figure legends
Figure 1: Cooperation-promoting institutions are not stable in a single well-mixed popula-
tion. (a) Frequency of cooperators, defectors, and asocials, and mean individual h-preference
(arithmetic average across all individuals in the population) as a function of time. (b) Car-
rying capacity of social individuals as a function of time. Parameters: Ka = 20, B = 0.9,
I = 0.1, γ = 0.0075.
Figure 2: In a spatially structured population, institutions that support cooperation evolve
and are stable. (a) Frequency of cooperators, defectors, and asocials, over 5000 generations.
(b) Mean h-preference (arithmetic average across all individuals in the population) over
5000 generations. (c) Mean carrying capacity of social individuals (mean Ksj(t)) over 5000
generations, averaged across patches. (d) Frequency of cooperators over 104 generations.
(e) Mean h-preference over 104 generations. (f) Mean carrying capacity of social individuals
over 104 generations, averaged across patches.
Parameters: Ka = 20, B = 0.9, I = 0.1, γ = 0.0075.
Figure 3: The co-evolution of institutions with demography can create a transition from
small- to large-scale cooperative groups. (a) Cooperation invades under a smaller initial
patch size and is maintained at equilibrium. (b) Individual h-preferences (arithmetic average
across all individuals in the population) stabilize to create institutions that invest most public
good into technological improvement, while still providing sufficient sanctioning to maintain
cooperation against defectors. (c) The benefits of cooperation allow the number of social
individuals to become very large.
Parameters: Ka = 20, B = 0.9, I = 0.1, β = 3000, γ = 0.00075 (see text).
Figure 4: Sensitivity to parameters. Plots show the percentage of runs (out of 100) in
which the cooperative equilibrium was reached within 50000 generations (see text). (a)
Decreasing the benefit of cooperation decreases the maximum initial patch size under which
cooperation reliably invades (m = 0.1, I = 0.1, γ = 0.0075). (b) Increasing the cost of
institution formation decreases the maximum patch size under which cooperation reliably
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invades. (m = 0.1, B = 0.9, γ = 0.0075). (c) Increasing the gradient of the benefit function
(γ in Equation 5) increases the range of patch sizes under which invasion occurs (m = 0.1,
B = 0.9, I = 0.1). (d) Increasing the migration rate decreases the maximum patch size
under which cooperation reliably invades (B = 0.9, I = 0.1, γ = 0.0075).
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Table 1: Baseline parameter settings.
Parameter Value
Cost of cooperating, C 0.1
Base growth rate, ra 2
Per capita effect of asocial individuals upon socials, αsa 0.05
Per capita effect of social individual upon asocials, αas 0.05
Maximum increase in carrying capacity due to cooperation, β 300
Mutation rate, µ 0.01
Variance of normal distribution used for mutations on h, σ 0.1
Number of patches, Np 50
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